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OMNIPOTENCE AGAIN 
Erik J. Wielenberg 
One of the cornerstones of western theology is the doctrine of divine omnipo-
tence. God is traditionally conceived of as an omnipotent or all-powerful 
being. However, satisfactory analyses of omnipotence are notoriously elusive. 
In this paper, I first consider some simple attempts to analyze omnipotence, 
showing how each fails. I then consider two more sophisticated accounts of 
omnipotence. The first of these is presented by Edward Wierenga; the second 
by Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso. I argue that both of these accounts fail. 
Finally, I propose and defend a novel account of omnipotence. 
When people have tried to read into "God can do everything" a signification 
not of Pious Intention but of Philosophical Truth, they have only landed them-
selves in intractable problems and hopeless confusions; no graspable sense has 
ever been given to this sentence that did not lead to self-contradiction or at 
least to conclusions manifestly untenable from a Christian point of view. 
- Peter Geach 
1. Introduction 
One of the cornerstones of western theology is the doctrine of divine 
omnipotence. God is traditionally conceived of as an omnipotent or all-
powerful being. However, satisfactory analyses of omnipotence are notori-
ouslyelusive. At least one philosopher has argued that no adequate analy-
sis of omnipotence can be given.1 Some of the difficulties can be made 
apparent by considering some simple analyses of omnipotence. 
A natural understanding of omnipotence is that it is the ability to do 
anything. As a first attempt to define 'omnipotent', then, we might try: 
(Dl) x is omnipotent =df. x can bring about any state of affairs. 
(Dl) leads to trouble immediately. It implies that an omnipotent 
being can bring about 
(rs) There exists a round square. 
Yet God cannot bring about (rs) since (rs) is metaphysically impossible. 
Thus, (Dl) implies that God is not omnipotent. (Dl) is lmacceptable for 
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theological reasons. We can weaken (Dl) to this: 
(D2) x is omnipotent =df. x can bring about any state of affairs that is 
metaphysically possible. 
27 
But God has promised not to lay waste to the earth with a flood2, that is, 
He has promised not to bring about this state of affairs: 
(ef) The earth is laid to waste by a flood. 
(ef) is a metaphysically possible state of affairs. But God is traditionally 
thought to be impeccable - He never does anything that is morally wrong. 
Furthermore, God has this property essentially. Let us say that x has F 
essentially =df. (i) x has F, and (ii) there is no possible world in which x 
exists and does not have F. Since God is impeccable in every world in 
which He exists, there is no world in which God performs a morally wrong 
action. Thus, God is incapable of performing any morally wrong actions. 
On the plausible assumption that it is morally wrong for God to break his 
promise not to bring about (ef), it follows that God cannot bring about (ef).l 
So (ef) is metaphysically possible; yet God cannot bring about (ef). 
Therefore (D2), like (Dl), implies that God is not omnipotent. This result is 
theologically unacceptable. 
A third analysis of omnipotence suffers from a different kind of defect. 
Consider: 
(D3) x is omnipotent =df. x can bring about any state of affairs, p, 
such that: it is metaphysically possible that x brings about p. 
Imagine the following fairly minor deity. This deity is essentially such 
that it is incapable of bringing about any state of affairs in which a non-
gray object exists. Let's assume that the deity is sufficiently powerful that 
it can bring about any contingent state of affairs which is not such that a 
non-gray object exists in that state of affairs. Since it is metaphysically 
impossible that this deity bring about any state of affairs in which a non-
gray object exists, (D3) implies that this deity is omnipotent. The deity can 
bring about any state of affairs that it is metaphysically possible for him to 
bring about. But it is clear that this relatively low-powered deity is not an 
all-powerful or omnipotent being. This deity can create only the drabbest 
of all possible worlds. Therefore, (D3) is defective because it implies that 
an obviously non-omnipotent being is omnipotent.4 
This brief discussion illustrates two of the main difficulties that arise in 
discussions of omnipotence. On the one side we have the Scylla of theo-
logical unacceptability; on the other lies the Charybdis of essentially limit-
ed beings. Any successful account of omnipotence must somehow navi-
gate a course between these twin terrors. 
In what follows I examine a pair of more complicated accounts of 
omnipotence. I argue that each of these accounts is unacceptable. I then 
suggest a new approach to omnipotence and show that it avoids the diffi-
culties that undo other accounts. 
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2. Edward Wierenga 
Edward Wierenga presents a sophisticated analysis of omnipotence in 
his book The Nature of God.S His analysis makes use of (i) the notion of an 
initial segment of a possible world, and (ii) a distinction between strongly actu-
alizing a state of affairs and weakly actualizing a state of affairs. 
Wierenga describes the notion of an initial segment of a possible world 
in these lines: 
It seems clear that two possible worlds could be alike up to a certain 
time and then diverge. For example, there might be worlds Wand 
W' which are alike up until a certain time t, but in W Jones freely 
commences to mow his lawn at t whereas in W' Jones freely refrains 
from mowing his lawn at t. Before t, W and W' seem indistinguish-
able; we can describe them as sharing an initial segment that termi-
nates at t.6 
Wierenga does not offer an analysis of the concept of an initial segment 
of a possible world. He notes that "the concept of an initial segment is an 
intuitive one, but it is difficult to make it precise."? Instead, he presents five 
principles about initial segments. Let us say that 'S(W,t), indicates an ini-
tial segment of a world, W, terminating at time t. Wierenga's five princi-
ples are: 
(WI) For every world Wand time t, there is a state of affairs S(w,t), 
which is an initial segment of W terminating at t. (For any world and 
time, there is aninitial segment of that world terminating at that 
time).8 
(W2) If S(W,t) and S'(W,t) are initial segments, then S(w,t) = S'(w,t). 
(No world has more than one initial segment terminating at a given 
time).9 
(W3) If S(W,t) = S(W',t), then, for every time t' such that t' is earlier 
than t, S(W,t') = S(W',t'). (If two worlds share an initial segment up 
to a certain time, then they share all their initial segments terminating 
at earlier times).l0 
(W4) IF S(W,t) = S(W',t), then for all x, x exists before t in W if and 
only if x exists before tin W'. (If two worlds share an initial segment 
terminating at t, then the very same objects exists in those two worlds 
before t).11 
(W5) A proposition p is true in an initial segment S(W,t) if and only if 
it is not possible that S(W,t) obtain and p be false.12 
Wierenga's analysis of omnipotence also makes use of a distinction. 
Following a number of other philosophers (e.g., Chisholm and Davidson), 
Wierenga distinguishes two senses in which a being may be said to bring 
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about a state of affairs. 
He writes: "some of the states of affairs we cause to obtain we cause 
directly. These are ones we bring about but not by bringing about some 
other state of affairs."13 Wierenga refers to this first way of bringing about 
a state of affairs as "strong actualization." He notes that "[w]e can often 
arrange it that some state of affairs obtains without causing it to obtain."l' 
Wierenga refers to this second way of bringing about a state of affairs as 
"weak actualization," and he offers this account of it: 
(W6) x weakly actualizes a state of affairs S if and only if there is 
some state of affairs T such that (i) x strongly actualizes T, and (ii) if x 
were to strongly actualize T, S would be actual. l5 
Here, then, is Wierenga's analysis of omnipotence: 
(0') a being x is omnipotent in a world W at a time t =df. In W it is 
true both that (i) for every state of affairs A, if it is possible that both 
S(W,t) obtains and that x strongly actualizes A at t, then at t x can 
strongly actualize A, and (ii) there is some state of affairs which x can 
strongly actualize at t.16 
Wierenga puts the definition less technically in these lines: 
[W]hat is required for a being to be omnipotent is that it be able to 
strongly actualize any state of affairs which is such that that being's 
strongly actualizing it is compatible with what has already hap-
pened. The second clause is added to preclude essentially impotent 
things, for example, stones, from trivially satisfying the definiens.17 
Despite its sophistication, Wierenga's analysis of omnipotence is defec-
tive. Let us say that a state of affairs, p, is red-infected =df. p is a state of 
affairs in which a red object exists. An obvious example of such a state of 
affairs is that a red wagon exists. More generally, we can say that for any 
color, C, a state of affairs, p, is C-infected =df. p is a state of affairs in which 
a C-colored object exists. 
Let us say that a being, x, is red-impaired =df. x is unable to actualize 
(weakly or strongly) any red-infected states of affairs. More generally, we 
can say that for any color, C, a being, x, is C-impaired =df. x is unable to 
actualize any C-infected states of affairs. 
Imagine a series of deities. The first of these deities, DeitYl, is essential-
ly red-impaired. It is impossible that DeitYl exists and is able to actualize 
some red-infected state of affairs. Therefore, it is impossible that Deityl 
exists and that Deityl actualizes some red-infected state of affairs. Since a 
being cannot actualize a state of affairs without existing, it follows that it is 
impossible that DeitYl actualize any red-infected state of affairs. 
Nevertheless, Deityl satisfies condition (i) of (0'), if, aside from this limita-
tion, Deityl has unlimited power. Because it is impossible that he actualize 
any red-infected state of affairs, his inability to actualize any red-infected 
states of affairs does not prevent him from satisfying condition (i) of (0'). 
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DeitY2 is also essentially red-impaired. Furthermore, he is essentially 
blue-impaired. But, aside from this limitation and the limitations shared 
by Deity1' Deity2 has unlimited power. 
The rest of the deities in the series are characterized in the same fashion. 
Each deity, DeitYn' has all the limitations of Deityn_1' and is essentially 
impaired with respect to some color that none of the preceding deities is 
impaired with respect to. The last deity in the series is essentially impaired 
with respect to every color except gray. This last deity can actualize only 
states of affairs in which gray objects existY 
Consider the following series of possible worlds. Each possible world is 
empty except for one of the deities in the series described above. There is 
one such possible world for each deity in the series. We can refer to these 
possible worlds by the position of the deity in the series. So, for instance, 
'wS' designates a possible world containing nothing but DeityS. Finally, let 
'tn' designate an arbitrary time in W n·19 
This imaginary example is the basis of the following objection to 
Wierenga's analysis of omnipotence: 
The Series of Deities Objection 
1. If (0') is correct, then each Deityn is omnipotent in wn at tn' 
2. It's not the ca?e that each Deityn is omnipotent in wn at tn. 
3. Therefore, (0) is incorrect. 
Premise (1) is clearly true. Each deity in the series is unable to bring 
about any states of affairs that is ruled out by his various color impair-
ments, but since it is impossible for a given deity to bring about a state of 
affairs ruled out by his color impairments, the fact that he cannot do so is 
no threat to his omnipotence on Wierenga's analysis. Each deity, Deityn' 
can strongly actualize any state of affairs such that his strongly actualizing 
it is compatible with S(wn, tn). So each deity satisfies condition (i) of (0'). 
Furthermore, every deity, even the last in the series, can bring about some 
state of affairs or other, and so each deity satisfies condition (ii). 
Premise (2) is supported by two distinct intuitions. The first intuition is 
that the last deity in the series, the one that is color-impaired with respect 
to all colors except gray, is clearly not an omnipotent being. 
However, the objection need not stand or fall with this intuition. There 
is a stronger intuition that supports premise (2). The intuition is that each 
deity in the series is less powerful than the one that precedes it - and cer-
tainly the last deity in the series is much less powerful than the first deity 
in the series. But omnipotence is supposed to be the highest possible 
degree of power. Thus, it seems absurd to suppose that two beings which 
are such that one is much more powerful than the other could both be 
omnipotent. Yet this is exactly what (G) implies; therefore, (G) is unac-
ceptable. 
Wierenga is not persuaded by this sort of objection. He writes: 
[someone might claim that] it is possible that there is a being with a 
wide range of abilities who is nevertheless essentially incapable of 
performing some other action (say, tying a shoe, remembering the 
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second stanza of our national anthem, or creating ex nihilo) which an 
omnipotent being ought to be able to do. But is it really possible that 
there be a being whose abilities are essentially limited in this way? 
For any agent who is incapable of tying a shoe, it would seem to be at 
least possible that God confer on the agent greater powers that 
include the ability to tie a shoe. In that case, it would be possible for 
any such limited being to do more than it is able to do.20 
Wierenga, then, replies to objections like the one I have given above by 
denying the logical possibility of essentially limited beings like the deities I 
have described. This denial is based on the claim that God is able to confer 
greater power on any limited being. Therefore, for any being and any limi-
tation of that being, there is a possible world in which the being exists and 
does not have that limitation, and so the limitation is not an essential one. 
This response will not do. The problem is that God himself is an essen-
tially limited being. He is essentially incapable of doing anything that is 
morally wrong. If Wierenga is right, however, God is able to confer on 
himself the power to perform morally wrong actions, and so He is not 
essentially limited after all. 
I can see no plausible basis for allowing that God is essentially limited 
and yet denying the logical possibility of any other essentially limited 
beings. I conclude that the Series of Deities objection refutes Wierenga's 
analysis of omnipotence.21 
3. Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso 
Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso tackle the problem of giving an analysis 
of omnipotence in their article "Maximal Power."22 Before stating their 
own view, they present five conditions that any analysis of omnipotence 
(or, as they would have it, maximal power) must meet. The first three con-
ditions are: 
(Cl) The analysis should be stated in terms of an agent's power to 
actualize or bring about states of affairs.23 
(C2) An omnipotent being should be expected to have the power to 
actualize a state of affairs only if it is logically possible that someone 
actualize that state of affairs.24 
(C3) Any adequate account of omnipotence must be relativized to a 
time.25 
The fourth condition makes use of a number of technical concepts that 
must be explicated before the condition can be stated. Like Wierenga, Flint 
and Freddoso draw a distinction between strong and weak actualization. 
They offer this account of strong actualization: 
Roughly, an agent S strongly actualizes a state of affairs p just when S 
causally determines p's obtaining, i.e., just when S does something 
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which in conjunction with other operative causal factors constitutes a 
sufficient causal condition for p's obtainin.g.26 
For instance, imagine that I flip a switch. This flipping of the switch, 
together with various other conditions involving wiring and electricity, is a 
sufficient causal condition for a light to go on. I have strongly actualized 
the state of affairs that a light is on. 
Flint and Freddoso characterize weak actualization as bringing about a 
state of affairs by, or in virtue of, strongly actualizing some other state of 
affairs.27 
Flint and Freddoso also appeal to the concept of a world-type. This con-
cept in tum makes use of two additional technical concepts: the concept of 
an individual essence and the concept of a counter factual of freedom. Flint and 
Freddoso offer this account of an individual essence (which they attribute 
to Plantinga): 
P is an individual essence if and only if P is a property which is such 
that (i) in some possible world there is an individual x who has P 
essentially and (ii) there is no possible world in which there exists an 
individual distinct from x who has P.2S 
An example of an individual essence is the property of being David 
Lewis. There is a possible world in which some individual has this proper-
ty essentially (namely, him, in the actual world) and necessarily, anyone 
who has this property is him. 
The second technical concept is the concept of a counterfactual of freedom: 
Q is a counterfactual of freedom =df. Q can be expressed by a sentence 
of the form "If individual essence P were instantiated in circum-
stances C at time t and its instantiation were left free with respect to 
action A, the instantiation of P would freely do A."29 
Flint and Freddoso endorse a libertarian account of freedom - that is, a 
view of freedom according to which "every free action must involve the 
occurrence of an event for which there is no antecedent sufficient causal 
condition."~) On such an account of freedom, no being can strongly actual-
ize a free action.3] Recall the analysis of strong actualization given above. 
In order to strongly actualize a free action, a being would have to bring 
about some state of affairs which, together with some other facts, consti-
tutes an antecedent sufficient causal condition for the occurrence of the free 
action. But if every free action necessarily involves an event for which 
there is no antecedent sufficient causal condition, then there can be no 
antecedent sufficient causal condition for a free action, and hence no one 
can strongly actualize a free action.32 
Another consequence of this view of freedom is that for any being, there 
is a set of counterfactuals of freedom such that the being has no control 
over the truth values of those counterfactuals.33 Flint and Freddoso call 
such sets world-types: 
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[A] world type is a set which is such that for any counterfactual of 
freedom, either that counterfactual or its negation is a member of the 
set. . .for any free agent x there will be a set of all and only those true 
counterfactuals of freedom ... over whose truth-value x has no con-
trol. . .let us refer to [this set] as the world-type-for-x.34 
So: 
A counterfactual of freedom, c, is a member of the world-type-for-x if and 
only if: (i) c is true, and (ii) x has no control over the truth-value of c. 
If 'Lx' designates the world-type-for-x, then we can state Flint and 
Freddoso's fourth condition like this: 
(C4) A being, x, should not be required, in order to rank as omnipo-
tent, to possess the power to actualize any state of affairs that does 
not obtain in any world in which Lx is true.35 
As an illustration of this requirement, consider an example discussed by 
Flint and Freddoso. Imagine a being, Jones, who is in a certain set of cir-
cumstances, C at a certain time, t, and is free with respect to writing a let-
ter to his wife. In such a case, according to Flint and Freddoso, Jones has 
the power at t to actualize 
(7) Jones's freely deciding in C at t to write a letter to his wife, 
and he also has the power at t to actualize 
(8) Jones's freely deciding in C at t to refrain from writing a letter to his 
wife.36 
Imagine that the following counterfactual of freedom is true (where 'C' 
indicates the circumstances Jones is in at t): 
(9) If Jones were in C at t, he would freely decide at t to refrain from 
writing a letter to his wife. 
Now consider the world-type-for-Smith, where Smith is distinct from 
Jones. Since (9) is a true counterfactual of freedom and Smith has no con-
trol over whether or not (9) is true, (9) is included in the world-type-for-
Smith. Smith cannot actualize (weakly or strongly) (7). But this does not 
exclude Smith from being omnipotent. (9) and (7) are incompatible: (7) is 
false in any world in which (9) is true. Since (9) is a member of the world-
type-for-Smith, (C4) implies that Smith may be omnipotent even though he 
cannot actualize (7). 
Flint and Freddoso's fifth condition is designed to avoid the difficulties 
presented by essentially limited beings: 
(C5) [N]o being should be considered omnipotent if he lacks the 
kind of power which it is clear an omnipotent agent ought to 
possess.37 
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Flint and Freddoso claim that the following account of omnipotence sat-
isfies each of (CI) through (C5): 
(D) S is omnipotent at t in W if and only if for any state of affairs p 
and world-type-for-S Ls such that p is not a member of Ls, if there is 
a world W such that 
(i) Ls is true in both W and W', and 
(ii) W' shares the same history with W at t, and 
(iii) at t in W' someone actualizes p, 
then S has the power at t in W to actualize p.38 
There are at least two important differences between this account and 
Wierenga's analysis. First, Wierenga's analysis dealt only with what a 
being could strongly actualize. Flint and Freddoso's account deals with 
what a being can actualize strongly and weakly. Second, notice condition 
(iii) above. One of Wierenga's necessary conditions for a state of affairs to 
be relevant to a given being's omnipotence is that it be metaphysically pos-
sible that that being strongly actualize the state of affairs. Flint and 
Freddoso offer a requirement that is easier for a state of affairs to satisfy: 
that it be metaphysically possible that someone actualize (weakly or strong-
ly) the state of affairs. 
This second difference is of particular importance because it enables 
Flint and Freddoso's account to avoid the Series of Deities objection that 
refuted Wierenga's analysis. Consider this state of affairs: 
(rw) There exists a red wagon. 
Deityl cannot actualize (rw) in WI at a given time 1. But there is a world 
WI" such that (i) LDeityl is true in both WI and WI" (ii) WI' shares the 
same history with WI at t, and (iii) at t in WI' someone actualizes (rw).'9 
Therefore, (D) implies that Deityl is not omnipotent at t in WI' Flint and 
Freddoso's account avoids the objection that felled Wierenga's analysis. 
Condition (ii) involves the notion of two worlds sharing the same histo-
ry. Although Flint and Freddoso offer an account of what it is for two 
worlds to share the same history, I think that their notion of two worlds 
sharing a same history is sufficiently similar to Wierenga's notion of two 
worlds sharing an initial segment that we can forego an examination of 
their discussion. 
At any rate, I think the discussion up to this point provides us with a 
clear enough picture of Flint and Freddoso's account of omnipotence to see 
that it is defective. 
Flint and Freddoso consider the following objection to their account of 
omnipotence: 
It might be thought that there are some states of affairs which are so 
evil that no possible world containing them is a world that anyone 
could be morally justified in actualizing. Hence, since no divine 
being could ever have the power even to weakly actualize these 
states of affairs, no such being could rank as omnipotent.40 
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Let's assume with Flint and Freddoso that there are such states of 
affairs. An example might be this state of affairs: 
(ic) An innocent child is tortured for one thousand years. 
The objection in the passage above can be formulated like this: 
1. If (D) is true, then God is not omnipotent. 
2. God is omnipotent. 
3. Therefore, (D) is false. 
The idea is that (D) implies that any omnipotent being is able to achlalize 
(ic). Since God cannot actualize (ic), it follows from (D) that God is not 
omnipotent (first premise). But this is absurd - God is omnipotent (second 
premise). Therefore, (D) is false. The objection charges (D) with theological 
unacceptability. 
Flint and Freddoso deny premise (1): 
[the objection] lacks efficacy against one who holds the ... belief that 
Yahweh is an essentially divine - and so essentially impeccable -
being. For on this view no state of affairs of the sort just described 
obtains ... in any possible world in which Yahweh exists.41 
The existence of God is logically incompatible with (ic) - and with any 
state of affairs relevantly like it.42 But why is this so? God is traditionally 
thought to be the creator of the world. Using Flint and Freddoso's terminol-
ogy, we can say that x is creative =df. x (weakly or strongly) actualizes any 
state of affairs which is such that someone actualizes it:'" God is essentially 
creative: in any world in which He exists, He (at least weakly) actualizes all 
the states of affairs that are achlalized by anyone in that world.44 So, if God 
exists in a world in which (ic) obtains, then God (at least weakly) actualizes 
(ic) in that world. But since it is morally wrong for any being to actualize (ic), 
and God is essentially impeccable (essentially such that He never performs 
any morally wrong action), it follows that there is no world in which God 
actualizes (ic). So if God exists in a world in which (ic) obtains it follows both 
that (i) God actualizes (ic) in that world, and (ii) God does not actualize (ic) in 
that world. Therefore, God does not exist in any world in which (ic) obtains. 
Recall (D) from above. Consider any time, t, and any world in which 
God exists, w. God cannot actualize (ic) at t in w. The objection 
charges that given this fact, (D) implies that God is not omnipotent at in 
w. But this is so only if there is some world, w', such that (i) w' shares 
the same history with wand (ii) (ic) obtains in w·. Since God exists in w 
prior to t wand w' share the same history only if God exists in w· prior 
to t,45 Furthermore, God is essentially indestructible - it is impossible 
that God ceases to exist. 46 Since God exists prior to t in w', He exists at 
all times after t in W·. But, as shown above, if God exists in w', then (ic) 
does not obtain in W·. Thus, if wand w' share the same history, then 
(ic) does not obtain in W·. Therefore, there is no world w' that satisfies 
both (i) and (ii) above, and so (D) does not imply that God is not 
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omnipotent at t in w (at least not on the basis of the fact that God can-
not bring about (ic) at tin w). 
I think that Flint and Freddoso's response is satisfactory. It shows that the 
reasoning supporting premise (1) is faulty, and so that premise is tillSUpport-
ed. Thus, the objection fails. However, their response to the objection opens 
the door to a revised version of the Series of Deities objection. 
Recall the series of deities discussed in section 2. Imagine that, in addi-
tion to his various color impairments, each deity has two additional fea-
tures. First, like God, each of these deities is essentially indestructible. It is 
impossible for any of the deities in the series to cease to exist. Second, each 
of these deities is essentially creative. 
Given these additional stipulations, the existence of a given deity in the 
series is logically incompatible with certain kinds of states of affairs. In 
particular, if a given deity is impaired with respect to color C, then the exis-
tence of that deity is logically incompatible with any state of affairs in 
which a C-colored object exists.47 The proof of this is straightforward. 
Consider a given deity in the series, D, who is impaired with respect to 
some color C. Assume for reductio that there is a world, w, in which it is 
true both that (i) D exists and (ii) a C-infected state of affairs, c, obtains. 
Since D is essentially creative, it follows that D (at least weakly) actualizes c 
in w. This implies that D is able to actualize c in w- but this is incompati-
ble with the fact that D is essentially C-impaired. Therefore, there is no 
world in which both (i) and (ii) are true. 
As before, imagine a series of possible worlds containing nothing but one 
of these deities - i.e. wn contains nothing but Deityn' Aside from his vari-
ous color impairments, each deity has unlimited power. Let 'tn' designate 
an arbitrary time in wn. This example is the basis of the following objection: 
The Series of Deities Objection (revised version) 
1. If (D) is true, then each Deityn is omnipotent at tn in wn. 
2. It's not the case that each Deityn is omnipotent at tn in wn. 
3. Therefore, (D) is false. 
Each of the deities can actualize any state of affairs not ruled out by con-
ditions (i)-(iii) of (D). On (D), each deity's inability to actualize certain 
states of affairs (Le. those ruled out by the deity's color impairments) is 
compatible with that deity's omnipotence. Consider, for instance, Deityl' 
His existence is logically incompatible with any state of affairs in which a 
red object exists. Deityl exists at all times prior to t in any world that 
shares the same history with wI at t. Since he is essentially indestructible, 
Deityl exists at all times after t in any world that shares the same history 
with wI. Therefore, no state of affairs in which a red object exists obtains 
in a world that shares the same history with wI at t, and (D) implies that 
Deityl is omnipotent at t in wI. Similar considerations apply for each 
deity in the series. Thus, premise (1) is true. 
As before, two distinct intuitions support premise (2). The first intuition 
is that the last deity in the series is obviously not an omnipotent being. If 
this intuition is correct, then Flint and Freddoso's account of omnipotence 
fails to satisfy their own condition (C5). 
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The second intuition is that since omnipotence is the highest possible 
degree of power, it is impossible that there are two beings such that the 
first is much more powerful than the second and yet both are omnipotent. 
But (D) implies that the first and last deities in the series are both omnipo-
tent, and the first deity is much more powerful than the last. I conclude 
that Flint and Freddoso's account of omnipotence is unacceptable.48 
4. A New Approach 
Every account of omnipotence we have examined so far has been shown to 
be defective, including two of the most sophisticated attempts to date. A 
new approach is in order. In this section I offer an account of omnipotence 
that is significantly unlike any of the accounts discussed in this paper. I 
then argue that my account adequately handles the cases that cause prob-
lems for these other accounts. 
The Case of Hercules 
Imagine a very strong man. Imagine that he is the strongest possible 
person: necessarily, no one is stronger than he is. Let's call him 
"Hercules." Perhaps we doubt that Hercules is in fact the strongest possi-
ble person. We want to test his strength. How might we go about this? 
One obvious test of strength is lifting ability. We ask Hercules to lift a 
one hundred pound stone. He lifts it easily. Next we ask him to lift a one 
thousand pound stone; He does so. Similarly for ten thousand pounds, one 
hundred thousand pounds - Hercules even lifts a million pound stone. 
So far we have failed to prove that Hercules is not the strongest possible 
person. But now imagine that we take a ten pound stone and coat it with a 
substance that renders it incredibly slippery. It is so slippery that no one 
can get a grip on it. Now we ask Hercules to lift this ten pound stone. 
Hercules cannot grip the stone and so cannot lift it. "Aha!" we declare tri-
umphantly, "Hercules, you are a liar! You said that you were the strongest 
possible person, yet you cannot lift this ten pound stone. This proves that 
you are not the strongest possible person." 
But of course we have not proven that Hercules is not the strongest pos-
sible person. For we know that Hercules is strong enough to lift the slip-
pery stone - we have just seen him lift much heavier stones. It is not a 
lack of strength that prevents Hercules from lifting the stone; it is the slip-
periness of the stone. 
Imagine that we have somehow acquired a ten pound stone that is 
essentially slippery. It is so slippery that no human can grip it, and so no 
human can lift it. Let's assume that Hercules is essentially human. It fol-
lows that there is no possible world in which Hercules lifts this stone. Yet 
it seems clear that Hercules is strong enough to lift the stone - even though 
it is metaphysically impossible that he do so. 
Now imagine that we happen to know some otl,er facts about Hercules. 
For instance, we know that he is so honest that he is literally incapable of 
breaking promises!9 We discover that he has previously promised never 
to lift a particular ten pound stone. We ask Hercules to lift this stone. He 
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is unable to do so. He is so honest that he is incapable of breaking his 
promise never to lift this stone. 
Again, it is clear that we have not proven that Hercules is not the 
strongest possible person. As with the slippery stone, it is not a lack of 
strength that prevents Hercules from lifting this stone; rather, it is his hon-
esty that renders him unable to do so. 
The moral of this story is that lifting ability is not a perfect indicator of 
strength. Which objects a being is able to lift varies with a variety of fac-
tors. One of these factors is of course the strength of the being, but it is cru-
cial to notice that there are others. The examples above show that which 
objects a being can lift can vary depending on (i) the (non-weight-related) 
properties of a given object, and (ii) the moral qualities of the being. 
Imagine that we are interested in giving an account of what it is to be 
the strongest possible being. We might say that such a being is 'omni-
strong.' The case of Hercules shows that it would be a mistake to try to 
explicate this concept in terms of lifting ability. Consider for instance: 
(A) x is omni-strong if and only if x can lift any object. 
There are at least two objects that Hercules cannot lift. Yet it is clear that 
this fact does not entail that Hercules is not the strongest possible being. 
(A) is false. (A) is based on the mistaken supposition that: 
(B) If x cannot lift y, then x lacks the strength to lift y. 
The examples above show that (B) is false. Those examples involve 
objects that Hercules cannot lift but which Hercules has the strength to lift. 
Now consider this principle: 
(C) x is omnipotent if and only if x can bring about any state of affairs. 
This is the starting point of many discussions of omnipotence. Many 
philosophers proceed by modifying (C) in an attempt to arrive at a satisfac-
tory analysis of omnipotence.50 What I want to suggest is that just as it is a 
mistake to try to explicate omni-strength in terms of which objects a being 
can lift, it is also a mistake to try to explicate omnipotence in terms of 
which states of affairs a being can bring about.51 Just as which objects a 
being can lift can vary depending on factors other than that being's level of 
strength, so which states of affairs a being can bring about can vary 
depending on factors other than that being's level of power.52 
Like (A), (C) is based on a mistaken supposition. Specifically, (C) is 
based on the mistaken supposition that 
(D) If x cannot bring about p, then x lacks the power to bring about p. 
In the discussion of Hercules it quickly became clear that the fact that 
there was a particular object that Hercules could not lift was not sufficient to 
prove that Hercules is not the strongest possible being. A further question 
had to be asked: why is Hercules unable to lift the object? If the answer is 
OMNIPOTENCE AGAIN 39 
that Hercules is lacking in strength, then we have proven that Hercules is 
not the strongest possible being. For instance, imagine that Hercules tries to 
lift a ten million pound rock. He struggles with it, grunting and sweating, 
but is unable to lift it. There are no other factors that might account for this 
inability (e.g., the rock is not slippery, it is not attached to the ground, he 
hasn't promised not to lift it). Hercules is unable to lift the rock - and the 
reason he is unable to lift it is that he lacks strength. This case, were it to 
occur, would prove that Hercules is not the strongest possible being. 
Similarly, with respect to power, the fact that a being is unable to bring 
about a particular state of affairs is not sufficient to prove that the being is 
not omnipotent. A further question must be asked: why is the being 
unable to bring about the state of affairs? If the answer is that the being is 
lacking in power, then it follows that the being is not omnipotent. Thus, I 
propose the following account of omnipotence: 
(0) x is omnipotent if and only if it is not the case that there is some state of 
affairs, p, such that x is unable to bring about p because of a lack of power in x. 
There are many different kinds of power that a being might have. Hercules, 
for instance, has the highest possible degree of physical power. Another kind 
of power might be mental power - intelligence. A third kind of power is 
what we can call "willpower." Willpower is a capacity for making things hap-
pen simply by willing them to happen. Humans have a relatively low level of 
willpower. We can move our bodies in various ways by exerting our willpow-
er. For instance, I can make my arm go up simply by willing that it do so. God 
has a much higher level of willpower. Everything in the universe is subject to 
His will. He can create and destroy through the sheer force of His will. 
(0) implies nothing about what kind of power an omnipotent being has. 
It is consistent with (0) that there is an omnipotent being that is completely 
devoid of a particular kind of power. This seems to be the case with God. 
Since He has no body, He has absolutely no physical power. The source of 
His omnipotence is His tremendous willpower. 
It seems that me that (0) handles each of the difficulties we have 
encountered so far. I tum now to consideration of these difficulties. 
Impossible states of affairs 
Just about everyone (with the infamous exception of Descartes) agrees that 
an omnipotent being should not be required to be able to bring about 
impossible states of affairs. A classic example of such a state of affairs is: 
(rs) There is a round square. 
God cannot bring about (rs). But on (0), we need not conclude from the 
fact that God is unable to bring about (rs) that He is not omnipotent. Recall 
the case of Hercules. Hercules could not lift a certain stone because it was 
too slippery. The source of Hercules' inability to lift the stone lies not in 
Hercules but rather in the stone. The case is the same with respect to God 
and (rs). The source of God's inability to bring about (rs) lies not in God 
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(specifically, it is not due to any lack of power in God), but rather in (rs) 
itself. Hercules cannot lift the slippery stone because the stone is slippery; 
God cannot bring about (rs) because (rs) is impossible. 
Essentially immoral states of affairs 
Someone might plausibly maintain that there are some states of affairs that 
are so intrinsically bad that necessarily, it is morally wrong for any being to 
bring them about. We can call such states of affairs essentially immoral. In 
my discussion of Flint and Freddoso's account of omnipotence I offered 
this state of affairs as an example of an essentially immoral state of affairs: 
(ic) An innocent child is tortured for one thousand years. 
Recall that God is essentially impeccable. Thus, there is no possible 
world in which God performs a morally wrong action. Since it is necessar-
ily true that bringing about (ic) is morally wrong, it follows that there is no 
possible world in which God brings about (ic). Therefore, God cannot 
bring about (ic). This constitutes a prima facie threat to His omnipotence. 
But if we adopt (0), then we are not forced to conclude that God is not 
omnipotent. Although the source of God's inability to bring about (ic) lies in 
God, it is not a lack of power in God that makes Him unable to bring about (ic). 
Instead, this inability is due to the fact that God has the highest possible degree 
of a certain property - moral goodness. Just as Hercules was unable to lift the 
ten pound stone that he had promised not to lift because he was honest, so God 
is unable to bring about (ic) because he is morally perfect. God's inability to 
bring about (ic) is compatible with the claim that God is omnipotent. 
Promises 
Recall the example in which God has promised not to lay waste to the 
earth with a flood. Once He has made this promise, God is unable to bring 
about this state of affairs: 
(ef) The earth is laid to waste by a flood. 
Again, this fact does not imply that God is not omnipotent. The solution 
to this apparent difficulty is much the same as the solution to the case 
involving an essentially immoral state of affairs. God's inability to bring 
about (ef) is not due to a lack of power in God. It is due to the fact that He 
has the highest degree of moral goodness. 
The mysterious case of Mr. McEar 
In God and Other Minds Alvin Plantinga discusses a strange and sad man 
who has come to be known in the literature as "Mr. McEar./I McEar, for 
unspecified reasons, is incapable of doing anything other than scratching his 
ear. Furthermore, he can in fact scratch his ear. It is clear, goes the argu-
ment, that whatever else may be said about such a bizarre being, McEar is 
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surely not orrmipotent. Yet many accounts of orrmipotence seem to imply 
that McEar is orrmipotent. Such accounts are unsatisfactory. 
Consider this state of affairs: 
(ed) The earth is destroyed by a comet. 
McEar cannot bring about (ed). But according to (0), this fact by itself 
does not entail that McEar is not orrmipotent. (0) requires that we ask this 
question: why is McEar unable to bring about (ed)? If this inability is due 
to some lack of power in McEar, then (0) implies that McEar is not orrmipo-
tent. If this inability is due to some other factor, then the fact that McEar 
cannot bring about (ed) does not imply that McEar is not orrmipotent. 
Before we answer this question we must address another issue. On (0) 
what is relevant to a being's orrmipotence is the explanation for that being's 
inability to bring about a given state of affairs. But there are two special 
kinds of cases we must consider. The first kind of case is illustrated by the 
following example. 
Consider Hercules' younger brother, Hercules the Younger. Hercules the 
Younger is extremely strong, but he is not as strong as Hercules. Consider 
some very heavy stone - a stone that weighs, say, ten thousand pounds. 'This 
stone is extremely slippery. It is so slippery that neither Hercules nor Hercules 
the Younger can get a grip on it, and so neither can lift it. Hercules is strong 
enough to lift this stone. The only thing that prevents him from lifting it is its 
slipperiness. However, Hercules the Younger is not strong enough to lift this 
stone. Even if he could grip it, he would not be able to lift it. 
In this case, Hercules the Younger is unable to lift the stone in question 
because (i) he cannot grip it and (ii) he lacks the strength (anyway). Each of 
(i) and (ii) by itself is sufficient to guarantee that Hercules the Younger can-
not lift the stone. We can say that Hercules the Younger's inability to lift this 
stone is overdetermined. 
Consider a second kind of example. Imagine a heavy stone that is 
somewhat slippery. The stone is slippery to such a degree that Hercules 
the Younger can get a grip on it, but he cannot get a secure enough grip on 
it to apply all of his strength in the attempt to lift it. He is unable to lift this 
stone. What is the explanation of this inability? 
It seems to me that this second case is a case where there are two factors, 
each of which partially explains Hercules inability to lift the stone, and nei-
ther of which alone explains that inability. If Hercules were significantly 
stronger, he would be able to lift the stone in question; similarly, if the stone 
weren't quite as slippery, he would be able to lift it. Thus, he is unable to lift 
this particular stone because it is slippery and he lacks strength. 
These examples reveal that there are two possible interpretations of (0): 
(01) x is omnipotent if and only if it is not the case that there is some 
state of affairs, p, such that x is unable to bring about p solely because of a 
lack of power in x. 
and, 
42 Faith and Philosophy 
(02) x is omnipotent if and only if it is not the case that there is some 
state of affairs, p, such that x is unable to bring about p at least partially 
because of a lack of power in x. 
I wish to endorse (02). (02) implies that in cases of overdetermination, if 
the fact that a given being is lacking in power is one of the reasons that being 
cannot bring about a given state of affairs, then that being is not omnipotent. 
In cases of partial explanation, it implies that if part of the explanation for a 
given being's inability to bring about a given state of affairs is that the being 
is lacking in power, then that being is not omnipotent. 
As far as I know, no one has ever explained just why it is that McEar is 
incapable of doing anything other than scratching his ear. But it is safe to 
assume that McEar is an ordinary person except for his strange disability. 
On this assumption, (02) implies that McEar is not omnipotent. Ordinary 
people simply are not powerful enough to bring about (ed). For instance, as 
I noted earlier, ordinary people have a relatively low level of willpower. 
McEar, then, has a relatively low level of willpower. He doesn't have 
enough willpower to bring about (ed); he is not strong enough to bring 
about (ed); in short, he doesn't have the power to bring about (ed). And this 
fact about McEar is at least part of the explanation of his inability to bring 
about (ed). Therefore, (02) implies (correctly) that McEar is not omnipotent. 
Free Human Actions 
One problem faced by theists is the problem of reconciling God's omnipo-
tence with the possibility of free actions on the part of humans. A full dis-
cussion of this topic lies well outside the scope of this paper. In this section 
I undertake the more modest goal of showing that there is at least one view 
concerning the relationship between God and free human actions such that 
the following four items are consistent: (i) the view in question, (ii) (02), 
(iii) the claim that God is omnipotent, and (iv) the claim that sometimes 
human beings perform free actions. 
The view I have in mind is the Molinist position described and defended 
by Thomas Flint in various places, most recently in his book Divine Providence: 
The Molinist Account.53 One of the central components of this view is the claim 
that God's knowledge comes in three varieties: natural knowledge (God's 
knowledge of necessary truths), middle knowledge (God's knowledge of 
those true contingent propositions the truth or falsity of which are not depen-
dent on God's free will) and free knowledge (God's knowledge of those true 
contingent propositions the truth or falsity of which are dependent on God's 
free will). Of particular interest here is the distinction between middle knowl-
edge and free knowledge. Those truths that God knows by His middle 
knowledge are "supposed to be true prior to, and hence independent of, 
God's will.l/54 Among those truths God knows by His middle knowledge are 
all true counterfactuals of freedom (see section 3 above). 
One implication of this view is that prior to any willing on the part of 
God, it will be true that God is unable to actualize (strongly or weakly) cer-
tain states of affairs. For example, suppose that the following counterfactu-
al of freedom is true (where 'e' indicates a given set of circumstances and 
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't' indicates a particular time): 
(CF) If Jolene were in circumstances C at time t, Jolene would freely eat 
ice cream. 
Consider this state of affairs: 
(jr) Jolene freely refrains from eating ice cream in Cat t. 
God is unable to actualize (jr). Does this fact imply that God is not 
omnipotent? The answer, if we adopt (02), is no. The reason is that it is 
clear that on the Molinist picture the fact that God cannot bring about (jr) is 
a consequence of the truth of (CF) and (CF) is true (logically) prior to any 
willing on God's part. Thus, we know that God is unable to actualize (jr) 
without even considering how powerful God is. Indeed, no matter how 
powerful God is, He will be unable to actualize (jr). And this shows there is 
no reason to think that a lack of power on the part of God contributes to His 
inability to bring about (jr). 
Yet another variation on the case of Hercules may be helpful here. 
Suppose we ask Hercules to lift a certain stone which is totally inaccessible 
to Hercules - a stone that is on another planet, for instance. The fact that 
Hercules cannot lift the stone in question (now) does not tell against 
Hercules' strength; lifting that stone on this occasion is simply out of the 
question for Hercules for reasons that have nothing at all to do with his 
strength. Similarly, on the Molinist view, actualizing (jr) is out of the gues-
tion for God for reasons that have nothing at all to do with His power. 
The series of deities 
Recall the series of deities discussed previously. What does (02) imply 
about these beings? As with McEar, we must ask why it is that these 
deities have the limitations that they have. Unlike McEar, we cannot 
assume that the deities are much like ordinary people. As I have described 
them, they are very unlike ordinary people - they are deities. 
One possible explanation for the deities' various color impairments is a 
lack of power on the part of each deity. Let us assume that the deities' cre-
ate by exercising their willpower. But each deity has a different level of 
willpower. For example, Deityl' despite having a relatively high level of 
willpower, simply lacks the willpower to create a red object. For instance, 
no matter how much he concentrates on the state of affairs that a red object 
exists and wills that this state of affairs obtain, nothing happens. The other 
deities' color impairments have similar explanations. 
If this is the case, then (02) implies that none of the deities in the series 
is omnipotent. None of the deities can bring about this state of affairs: 
(ro) There exists a red object. 
Furthermore, the explanation for each deity's inability to bring about 
(ro) is that the deity lacks power. Therefore, according to (02), the deity is 
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not omnipotent. This is the correct result. 
But this is not the only possible explanation for the deities' impairments. 
Another possibility is that although each deity has enough willpower to 
will any object into existence, the deities' are simply unacquainted with 
certain colors. One possible explanation for this condition is that the 
deities' visual organs are constructed in such a way that they simply can-
not perceive certain colors.55 
On the assumption that it is this lack of knowledge, and not a lack of 
power, that accounts for each deity's inability to bring about certain states 
of affairs (and barring any other impairments), (02) implies that each deity 
in the series is omnipotent. But doesn't this show that (02) is refuted by 
the very same example that refutes Wierenga's as well as Flint and 
Freddoso's account of omnipotence? 
The answer is no. After all, if each deity in the series really is powerful 
enough to create any object, then each deity in the series really is omnipo-
tent, despite his various limitations. The case of Hercules is helpful here. 
We can imagine a series of beings like Hercules - that is, beings such that 
necessarily, no being is stronger. 
Now imagine that each of these beings has a strange psychological con-
dition: each is terrified of any object over a certain weight. So, for instance, 
the first being in the series, Herculesl' is terrified of any object over one 
hundred thousand pounds. Hercules2 is terrified of any object over ten 
thousand pounds; Hercules3 is terrified of any object over one thousand 
pounds, and so on. These psychological conditions are so severe that each 
of these beings is unable to be in the same room with, much less actually 
lift, an object over a certain weight. 
Herculesl can lift objects that are much heavier than any object that 
Hercules3 can lift. Nevertheless, Herculesl and Hercules3 are equally 
strong. I think the case is much the same with the series of deities. Each is 
equally powerful, despite the extreme variance in the kinds of objects that 
each can in fact create. And each is omnipotent.56 
5. Conclusion 
I have examined a total of six accounts of omnipotence in this paper. Each of 
the first five of these has been shown to be defective. What these five defective 
accounts have in common is that each one, as Geach would have it, tries to 
read into "God can do everything" a signification of Philosophical Truth. My 
view is that the expressions "God is omnipotent" and "God can do every-
thing" have much less to do with each other than is commonly thought. I 
have offered an account that does not try to explicate omnipotence in terms of 
which states of affairs a being can in fact bring about. And I have shown that 
my account avoids some of the difficulties that plague other accounts. 
(02), then, succeeds where many other accounts of omnipotence have 
failed. Perhaps there are problems with (02) as well. But I think I have 
established that (02) constitutes a promising alternative to more traditional 
approaches to omnipotence. 57 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
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or at least a reason, must be given for thinking that there could not be beings 
aside from God that are essentially indestructible and essentially creative. For 
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other critical discussions of Flint and Freddoso's view, see Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz, op. cit., and Jerome Gellman, "The Limits of Maximal Power, 
"Philosophical Studies 55 (1989). 
49. If this seems implausible, we can stipulate that, like Alex in A Clockwork 
Orange, Hercules has been conditioned to avoid breaking his promises - the 
mere thought of breaking a promise renders him incapacitated by nausea. 
50. Each of the philosophers whose views are discussed in this paper pro-
ceeds in roughly this fashion. Other examples include: Alvin Plantinga, op. 
cit., Peter Geach, "Omnipotence," Philosophy 48 (1973), Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz, op. cit., and Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1979) (although Kenny's own account of 
omnipotence differs significantly from the standard approaches). 
51. In arguing that no satisfactory account of omnipotence can be given, 
Richard LaCroix assumes that any account of omnipotence must take this form 
(LaCroix,op. cit., p. 184). I deny this claim; if I am right, then LaCroix's argu-
ment fails. 
52. There is a sense of 'power' according to which "x is powerful enough to 
bring about p" means the same as "x can bring about p." Obviously I am not 
using 'power' in this sense; I believe there is another sense of 'power' accord-
ing to which it makes sense to say that a being has enough power to bring 
about p and yet is unable to bring about p (for other reasons). 
53. Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
54. Flint, op. cit., p. 123. The priority here is logical, not temporal. 
55. This case was suggested by Ben Bradley. As always, we need to 
assume that these impairments are essential properties of the deities. To make 
the example work, we may need to flesh out these deities somewhat. Suppose 
that the deities must create by mentally visualizing what they wish to create 
and then willing the visualized object into existence. This would make it clear 
that if a given deity is unacquainted with a particular color that deity will be 
unable to create an object of that color (since he will be unable to visualize an 
object of that color). 
56. Notice that this example does not undermine my objections to the 
views of Wierenga and Flint and Freddoso. For even in the first case, where 
the deities lack the willpower to bring about certain states of affairs, those other 
accounts imply that each deity is omnipotent. 
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